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The Curse of the Red Sox Remains
Interviewing Doug Gardner
By: Keith Dobkowski
To Read More By Keith Dobkowski Please Visit Legalball.com
Can going Zero for Four be a success? How about four for four being a failure? After speaking with former Boston Red Sox Sports Psychologist Doug Gardner, both questions make sense.
As a batter, if you were to hit four balls on the screws and great plays were made to rob you of four hits, wouldn't that still be a success? And if you were to take bad swings, make bad contact and end up with four infield singles, could you really claim victory.
When success is measured by control and not results the answer is clearly yes. As a batter, you are to hit the ball as hard as you can as often as you can. A batter is to work the count into his favor so that the batter can get the pitch he desires in the hopes of hitting the ball hard. However, in the case that you hit the ball hard and a defensive player who is paid millions a year to make great plays, makes a great play, did you, as a batter, do anything wrong? You hit the ball on the screws. And a player paid millions to catch that ball caught it.
A batter only controls how hard he hits the ball and not how great of a defensive play will follow. Or so says Doug Gardner.
Doug Gardner started with the Cleveland Indians as an intern and upon completing his degree joined the Boston Red Sox. Gardner???s biggest claim to fame is the development of Shea Hillenbrand, former American League Rookie of the Year.
Gardner and Hillenbrand were first placed together when Hillenbrand reached Double-A ball for the Boston Red Sox. Over a dinner of Carne Asada, the two got to know one anther and Gardner quickly picked up on Hillenbrand's weaknesses. Hillenbrand was often distracted by both off-field activities of his teammates and result-based success.
Hillenbrand was distracted by the other players' lack of care and work ethic. And these distractions affected Hillenbrand in both the field and in the batter's box. With Gardner's help, Hillenbrand was able to focus on the task at hand. His natural ability lead him so far, but to make the giant leap into the Majors, Hillenbrand would have to learn to focus on what he could control.
As Gardner often stated during our interview, results do not determine success. A mistake pitch can be a strike and a great pitch can be hit over the fence. Success should be measured by control and not results. A batter's job is to hit the ball hard, but once it leaves the bat, the ball is outside of the batter's control.
Understanding Gardner's message helped Hillenbrand succeed. However, turmoil with the Boston Red Sox followed. Gardner believed that his job was to save the organization money by helping younger, less expensive players become stars. When Hillenbrand became the everyday third baseman for the Red Sox, Dante Bichette took a seat on the bench. With him, Bichette took his $10 million salary.
Gardner stated that his work with Hillenbrand allowed the Red Sox to play a $250,000 player instead of a $10 million player. Gardner had saved the organization millions. However, the Red Sox, a "yes sir" organization, saw Gardner's desire for credit as an insult and parted ways with the sports psychologist shortly thereafter.
So while the curse of the Babe looms large in Bean Town, sometimes it is the smaller decisions that truly affect an organization. Grady Little keeping Pedro Martinez in. Bill Buckner not being replaced by a defensive first baseman in the late innings of game six, because the manager wanted Buckner to be on the field for the celebration. Not pulling the trigger on A-Rod while backstabbing Nomar and Man-Ram in the process. And on the small behind the scenes scale, firing Gardner even though he had saved the team millions by helping develop young players.
Finally, as any baseball fan will tell you or rather name for you, Gardner and I discussed the player every team has with all the talent in the world but just couldn't cut it.
In San Francisco, Shawn Estes was that player. Estes, a left-handed pitcher with a mid nineties fastball and a 12 to 6 curveball where the bottom completely dropped out, never reached his full potential. Even in Estes' best season when he won 19 games for the Giants, any fan could see the mental battle he faced on the mound. Estes was often seen talking to himself, belittling himself over pitches thrown and mistakes made.
When discussing this very issue with Gardner, he again came to control. A pitcher only controls the ball until it leaves his fingertips. At that very point, a pitcher can no longer decide if the ball breaks enough. A perfect pitch can still be hit out of the park. Remember, Barry Bonds' is paid $20 million a year to hit the ball.
Gardner's philosophy based off reality and not clinical psychology butts heads directly with the past belief that a player must think of nothing in order to succeed. Gardner's vision of focus and control allows a player to celebrate what the rest of us may see as failure. So when Shea Hillenbrand went Zero for Four on opening night and many Diamondbacks' fans groaned, Hillenbrand called Gardner to discuss his four successful at bats. Hillenbrand worked the count and hit the ball hard. Hillenbrand, and thus Gardner, had done his job. So too had the defensive players.
An Introduction to: Disability Insurance 3, Baseball Fans 1
By: Keith Dobkowski, Sports and Legal Issues
Keith@sportsbusinesssims.com
V.P. of Sports and Legal Research
The Major League Baseball Winter Meetings came to a close on Monday, December 15, 2003. ESPN analysts have called this the hottest winter meetings of all time. Leading with the Alex Rodriguez (pictured below) rumors and the signing of Miguel Tejada by the Baltimore Orioles for 6-years and $72million, this years annual winter meetings have been hyperactive.
[img=file:///C:/My%20Documents/SBS/arod.jpg]AROD[/img]
As exciting as all the transactions are, or as painful for some teams, avid sports fans must not only ask who is where, by why is there so much movement?
o Why is this the hottest hot stove of all time?
o Why are so many players changing teams?
o And what will the end result be of all the transactions?
In my working paper entitled, "Disability Insurance 3, Baseball Fans 1" I tackle this issue directly. My paper, along with numerical data, comparisons to other professional sports leagues and a proposed solution has been made available by Sports Business Simulations, Inc., and can be found on their website at www.sportsbusinesssims.com under the working paper section.
My theory is as follows: Beginning in the 2002 off-season, disability policies were limited to 2 to 3 year increments, as opposed to the entire length of the contract. While this change in policy length appears simple on its face, it creates a huge problem for all of Major League Baseball.
When a baseball player signs a contract with a team, the contract is figured in terms of years and salary. Many contracts contain options and bonuses for performance goals. For example, Barry Bonds (pictured below) received a monetary bonus as part of his contract for winning the Most Valuable Player award. Player's contracts often provide escape clauses for the organization in regards to dangerous off-field activities. Such excluded activities often include skiing and motorcycle riding. The contract between a player and team is normally guaranteed, meaning that the years and money offered must be paid in full. Due to the high risk of injury, teams take on an additional cost by insuring the health of their players, essentially insuring the contract money.
[img=file:///C:/My%20Documents/SBS/bonds600th1ss.jpg]Bonds[/img]
For instance, if player A were to sign a 5 year, $10million contract to play for Team, and player A were to break his leg in year one, making player A unable to play out the remainder of his contract, the Team could file a disability insurance claim to receive back a large percentage of the lost salary.
The risk that exists occurs from the frequency and unforeseen nature of injuries. Cal Ripkin played in 2632 straight games, while Albert Belle's injury sidelined his career in 2000. Due to the unforeseen nature of injuries, Insurance companies have limited the length of Player coverage they will offer. Beginning in the 2002 off-season, disability policies were limited to 2 to 3 year increments, as opposed to the entire length of the contract. While this change in policy length appears simple on its face, it creates a huge problem for all of Major League Baseball.
Recall the above hypothetical where player A signs a 5-year, $10million contract to play for Team. Under the new disability system that limits the length of coverage, if player A were to sustain an injury in year one that kept player A from playing the rest of the five years for Team, Team would be limited in the amount of money Team could recover. Under the old disability coverage, Team could have Insurance Company pay for a large percentage of player A's salary. Under the new coverage limits, Team would only receive coverage on player A for two to three years and Team would then be responsible to pay player A's salary in whole for years four and five.
When Insurance Companies limit the length they will insure a player's contract for or even offer insurance to, a team is less willing to accept the risk involved in offering a long-term contract to a player. Most likely, a team will offer a player a contract of the same length of the insurance policy, two to three years. Every year there will prove to be exceptions, but for the most part, this practice will hold true. The net result is as follows.
Short contracts leads to greater turnover of players. Greater player turnover leads to less familiar teams being fielded. The less familiar a team appears to a fan, the more work a fan must put forth in order to root for the fan's favorite team or even to recognize the team. More work by the fan leads to greater disenchantment by the fan. And eventually disenchantment will drive fans from the game of baseball.
My theory has held true as in 2002, the average player received a contract of approximately 2.7 years in length. In the 2003 season, after the new disability insurance rules went into affect, the average players contract was only 1.6 years in length, over a 40% drop in contract length.
As of January 10, 2004, the average free agent player contract was only 1.3 years in length, over a 50% drop from two years ago.
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All information offered can be found in my working paper entitled, "Disability Insurance 3, Baseball Fans 1." My paper, along with numerical data, comparisons to other professional sports leagues and a proposed solution has been made available by Sports Business Simulations, Inc., and can be found on their website at www.sportsbusinesssims.com under the working paper section.
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My other articles are available at:
sportslaw.blogeasy.com
ncaalaw.blogeasy.com
nfllaw.blogeasy.com
mlblaw.blogeasy.com
www.sportsbusinesssims.com
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